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Abstract. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is the classic solution concept for
games with incomplete information, where players optimize under given beliefs
over states. We introduce a new concept called perfect compromise equilibrium,
where players find compromise decisions that are good in all states. This so-
lution concept is tractable even if states are high dimensional as it does not
rely on priors, and it always exists. We demonstrate the power of our solu-
tion concept in prominent economic examples, including Cournot and Bertrand
markets, Spence’s signaling, and bilateral trade with common value.
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1. Introduction
The classic solution concept in games of incomplete information is perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). However, many aspects surrounding this concept
raise doubts as to whether this is the way we should solve such games. Players are
uncertain about the primitives and yet they are willing to add even more details
by assigning probabilities to possible events. PBE are often difficult to compute
or are intractable, thus confining many of our insights to be limited to very simple
examples with two types.
We set out to introduce a new concept for solving games with informational un-
certainty, where players do not know something about the environment or about
what others know. On the one hand, the concept should avoid the above pitfalls.
It should not be based on a specific prior over uncertain events. It should allow
different players to see the world differently. It should be tractable in salient ex-
amples. On the other hand, the concept should not be too different from PBE.
Preferences of players should be comparable to those used in PBE. In particular,
known random events, such as tossing a coin, should be treated as in PBE. There
should be common knowledge of the equilibrium strategies. So there will be strate-
gic certainty. Challenges are multifold, such as avoiding dynamic inconsistency,
modeling learning in the game, and holding off the criticism of those who would
like us to choose a different model of optimization under uncertainty. Our solution
includes a new rhetoric based on balancing losses and finding compromises. Our
examples reveal the tractability of our concept. Our conviction is to provide an
alternative to PBE which is reasonable and insightful in applications.
The key ingredient to our approach is that players do not optimize, they com-
promise. Traditionally, players optimize with respect to some beliefs. However,
this is not possible in our model as we do not assume a prior over uncertain events.
Instead, players compromise. They look in each possible event and the loss of not
playing a best response in this event, and then make a choice that balances these
losses across all events.
Our new solution concept for games with incomplete information is called perfect
compromise equilibrium (short, PCE). Uncertainty is captured by including a set
of states (or events). At the outset, nature chooses one of these states, but none
of the players knows which state has been chosen. Each later information set is
assigned a subset of states, those that are conceivable for the player who moves
at that information set. Information about the state might be revealed to some
of the players during the game, like a buyer learning her value. This is modeled
by a move of player 0 who is in charge of all chance moves. The mixed strategy
of player 0 is common knowledge. The rest of the game unfolds like a standard
extensive form game. For each information set, there is a set of actions of the player
who is making the choice, a set of conceivable states, and a belief, conditional on
a conceivable state, over the decision nodes within this information set. These
elements allow us to compute expected payoffs at each information set conditional
on each conceivable state using Bayes’ rule. The performance of an action at an
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information set is evaluated for a conceivable state by comparing its payoff to
the best payoff that could have been attained if one had known the state and
had been allowed to choose a different action at this information set. We refer to
this difference as the loss at that information set. Actions are evaluated by their
maximum loss across all conceivable states. An action is called a best compromise
if no other action at this information set has a lower maximum loss.
Analogous to sequential rationality in PBE, we impose a minimal consistency
requirement on the conceivable states. A state that is conceivable at an informa-
tion set must remain conceivable at all information sets that can be reached under
this state given the strategy profile and the beliefs.
The elimination of priors over uncertain events comes with numerous advan-
tages in comparison to PBE. Solutions are often easier to obtain. They are more
parsimonious as they do not change with a prior. Solutions are more intuitive as
they are simple and depend on concrete model primitives. Preferences condition
on observables and not on fictitious distributions. Solutions can be justified in
front of others who have different priors. Uncertainty and ambiguity enter the
model distinctly.
We do not introduce a new non-expected utility method for evaluating strate-
gies. The evaluation of a strategy under a given state is as under PBE. The
term “compromise” reflects the fact that the equilibrium strategy will be evalu-
ated across all states, regardless of which state has been realized. The adjective
“perfect” refers to the fact that optimization takes place at all information sets,
not only at the outset.
Learning about the uncertainty is modeled by updating conceivable sets. Dy-
namic inconsistency that potentially arises by a player incorporating different
worst cases at different information sets is avoided by imposing deviations only at
the information set where a strategy is being evaluated. Future choices are not
questioned at that point as the player anticipates that she will reoptimize at each
future information set.
Our concept has nice properties. It allows for addressing problems with rich
uncertainty that are intractable under PBE. It collapses to PBE is there is only
a single state. It always exists under standard assumptions. Players will make
rational moves as strictly dominated strategies will not be chosen.
Four examples are presented to show how the PCE concept applies. We first
consider common uncertainty and investigate Cournot competition with unknown
demand. Demand is a state drawn by nature. Firms only know that it is bounded
by two given linear functions. Next, we consider private information and analyze
Bertrand competition where each firm only knows its own marginal cost. We then
move on to signaling and look at Spence’s job market. Firms only know that
the cost-productivity combinations of the worker are bounded by two given linear
functions. Finally, we consider asymmetric information with common value and
analyze sequential bilateral trade where one side has private information.
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We are proud to highlight some aspects of our findings in these examples in
terms of realism, good compromises, and new insights. All our examples are more
realistic than those found in the literature, as we do not have to confine ourselves
to parametric models of uncertainty and to models with two states (high and low).
Our examples are concerned with strategic decision making under rich uncertainty
where states are high dimensional and PBE analysis is no longer tractable. Com-
promise values are negligible in the Cournot and Bertrand competition settings.
In these contexts it makes little sense to think in more detail about which state
is really the true one, as payoffs would only be slightly higher in some states but
could be substantially lower in other states. New insights appear. We find that
adding uncertainty makes firms more competitive under Cournot competition and
less competitive under Bertrand competition. In the separating equilibrium of
Spence’s job market signaling game, better educated workers are not necessarily
more productive, unlike in the classic model with two types. In the sequential
bilateral trade with common value, we find that trade is possible, as opposed to
the famous no-trade theorem for PBE in this context (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).
Under PCE the possibility that the trading partners have different valuations leads
to trade with positive probability, as ignoring this possibility generates losses that
the traders want to minimize. Under PBE there is no trade as the trading partners
always agree on the expected valuation of the good.
Related Literature. Our paper contributes to the literature on robustness and
ambiguity in games of incomplete information.
The most related paper to ours is Hanany, Klibanoff and Mukerji (2018). They
consider a game of incomplete information in which traditional players are replaced
by players with smooth ambiguous preferences, as introduced in Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji
(2005). Hanany, Klibanoff and Mukerji (2018) show how to update information
in a dynamically consistent fashion, and this updating satisfies the one shot devi-
ation principle. Hence, their approach is better founded in the axiomatic context.
However, the intricacies that emerge from their mathematical formulation make
their solution concept complex, and impede finding tractable solution in examples
with rich state spaces, like the ones in this paper.
An important ingredient of our solution concept is our use of compromise for
making choices when the true state is unknown. A popular alternative approach in
the literature on ambiguity is maximin preferences (Wald, 1950; Gilboa and Schmeidler,
1989). These preferences have been brought to simultaneous-move games with in-
complete information and multiple priors by Epstein and Wang (1996), Kajii and Morris
(1997), Kajii and Ui (2005), and Azrieli and Teper (2011). While this approach
can be suitable in many applications, it leads to unintuitive results in our ex-
amples. To obtain nontrivial results, additional structural assumptions need to
be added, such as assuming knowledge of the mean state, which reintroduces the
priors that we are trying to eliminate.
Our idea of best compromise has origins in minimax regret (Savage, 1951) and
connects to ε optimality. Our optimization criterion differs from minimax regret
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as evaluation occurs at each information set, while minimax regret traditionally
evaluates regret ex post. For an investigation of minimax regret under strategic un-
certainty see Linhart and Radner (1989), and under partial strategic uncertainty
see Renou and Schlag (2010).
PCE can be considered as a generalization of ex post Nash equilibrium (Cremer and McLean,
1985). It can be thought of as an ε-ex post Nash equilibrium in which the small-
est possible value of ε is chosen for each player. As a concept, ε-Nash equilibrium
(Radner, 1980) is usually seen as a play under the restriction that deviations are
only undergone if payoff improvements are substantial. Our interpretation is dif-
ferent. The value of ε does not measure the inertia that needs to be overcome, but
instead it measures the compromise needed to accommodate all possible states.
In particular, the threshold ε is endogenous in a PCE.
Stauber (2011) analyzes the local robustness of PBE to small degrees of am-
biguity about player’s beliefs. In particular, it does investigate how the players
adjust their play to this ambiguity, unlike our paper.
In fact, PCE can be interpreted as a globally robust version of PBE where
robustness (Huber, 1965) means to make choices that also perform well if the model
is slightly misspecified. Being a compromise, our suggested strategies perform well
in each state given how others make their choices, never doing too badly relative
to what could be achieved in that state. This stands in contrast to the maximin
utility approach that focuses attention on the state where payoffs are lowest.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our solution concept. In
Section 3 we illustrate PCE in four self-contained examples. Section 4 concludes.
All proofs are in Appendix A. Some additional examples are in Appendix B.
2. Perfect Compromise Equilibrium
We introduce a solution concept called perfect compromise equilibrium (PCE).
The essential difference of PCE from perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is as
follows. In PBE, players choose strategies that are best under their beliefs about
an uncertain state. Instead, in PCE players choose compromises that are good in
all realizations of the state. When a player makes a move, she evaluates her action
in each state by her loss relative to the best payoff in that state, and then finds a
best compromise action that achieves the lowest maximum loss.
A formal definition of PCE is presented in Section 2.1 below. A reader who
wishes to be spared with the formalities and seeks to understand the essence
of PCE and its applicability can jump to Section 3 that presents self-contained
examples.
2.1. Formal Setup. Consider a finite extensive-form game described by (N0,G, u,
s0), where N0 = {0, 1, ..., n} is a set of players, G is a finite game tree, u is a profile
of payoff functions, and s0 is a strategy of player 0 who is nonstrategic.
Game tree G describes the order of players’ moves, players’ information sets, and
actions that are available at each information set. It is defined by a set of linked
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decision nodes and terminal nodes that form a tree. Each decision node is assigned
three elements: a player i, an information set φ that contains this decision node,
possibly, together with other decision nodes that player i cannot distinguish, and
a set of actions available to player i at that information set. Information sets and
action sets satisfy the standard assumptions of games with perfect recall. Let φ0
be the initial decision node of the game, let Φ be the set of all information sets
except φ0, and let T be the set of terminal nodes of the game. Let i(φ) be the
player that makes a move at an information set φ, and let A(φ) be a finite set of
actions available at φ.
The game starts with a move of nature. Nature moves only once, at the initial
decision node φ0. An action of nature ω is called state and is chosen from a finite
set Ω of available states, so Ω = A(φ0).
The game terminates after finitely many moves at some terminal node, and
players obtain payoffs. A payoff function of each player i ∈ N0 specifies the payoff
ui(τ) of player i at each terminal node τ ∈ T . Player 0 is nonstrategic, so we
assume that her payoff is always zero.
A strategy of each player i ∈ N0 prescribes a mixed action si(φ) for each infor-
mation set φ ∈ Φ in which imakes a move, so i(φ) = i and si(φ) ∈ ∆(A(φ)). Player
0 is non-strategic and follows an exogenously given strategy s0. A strategy profile
s describes the behavior of all players throughout the game, so s(φ) ∈ ∆(A(φ))
for each φ ∈ Φ and each state ω ∈ Ω.
Like in Bayesian games, we specify not only strategies, but also beliefs of the
players. The crucial difference is that, in our setting, the players do not form
priors about the move of nature, that is, about states in Ω. Instead, ex ante they
consider all states as possible. A player can rule out the possibility of some states
by being in an information set which cannot be reached under these states. Thus,
the belief in each information set is decomposed into two elements: conceivable set
and posterior. A conceivable set deals with the player’s ambiguity about the state.
A posterior deals with the uncertainty that arises through probabilistic moves of
other players at earlier information sets.
A state ω is called conceivable at an information set φ ∈ Φ if, upon reaching φ,
the possibility that the true state is ω is not ruled out. A conceivable set B(φ)
is a set of states that are conceivable at φ. Formally, for each information set
φ ∈ {φ0}∪Φ, B(φ) is a nonempty subset of Ω, with the convention that all states
are initially conceivable, so B(φ0) = Ω.
A posterior β(φ|ω) assigns to each information set φ ∈ Φ and each state ω ∈
B(φ) a probability distribution over decision nodes in φ conditional on the state
being ω.
Like in PBE, we will require consistency of beliefs.
Definition 1. A profile (B, β) of conceivable sets and posteriors is consistent with
a strategy profile s if the following conditions hold for all ω ∈ Ω.
(a) Let φ′ ∈ Φ. If there does not exist a path in G from φ0 to φ′ in which
nature’s move at φ0 is ω, then ω 6∈ B(φ′).
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(b) Let φ ∈ Φ and let α be a decision node in φ such that β(φ|ω)(α) > 0.
Let φ′ ∈ Φ be an information set that is reached from node α in one move
under s with a strictly positive probability. Then ω ∈ B(φ′) and β(φ|ω)
follows Bayes’ rule.
Condition (a) stipulates which states must be excluded from the conceivable
set. Every state under which the current information set cannot be reached no
matter what actions players choose must be ruled out. Condition (b) stipulates
which states must be included in the conceivable set and how the posteriors are
computed. Every state under which the current information set is reachable from
an earlier information set under a given strategy profile is conceivable and can-
not be ruled out. The posteriors follows Bayes’ rule whenever possible given the
posteriors in the earlier information sets.
We now define PCE. Consider a profile of strategies, conceivable sets, and pos-
teriors (s, B, β). Let u¯i(xi, s|ω, φ, β) denote the expected payoff of player i from
choosing a mixed action xi ∈ ∆(A(φ)) in an information set φ where i makes her
move, so i(φ) = i, conditional on the state being ω ∈ B(φ) and assuming that the
play is given by s elsewhere in the game. The payoff difference
sup
ai∈A(φ)
u¯i(ai, s|ω, φ, β)− u¯i(xi, s|ω, φ, β)
is called player i’s loss from choosing mixed action xi at information set φ when
the state is ω. It describes how much better off player i could have been at
this information set under state ω if, instead of choosing xi, she had chosen the
best action in this state, without changing actions prescribed by s in any other
information set. The maximum loss of player i from choosing mixed action xi in
information set φ where i = i(φ) is given by
l(xi, s|φ, β) = sup
ω∈B(φ)
(
sup
ai∈A(φ)
u¯i(ai, s|φ, ω, β)− u¯i(xi, s|φ, ω, β)
)
.
So the maximum (supremum) is sought over all states that are conceivable for
player i at φ.
Our equilibrium concept requires strategies to be chosen optimally in the sense
of minimizing the players’ maximum losses given their beliefs, and the beliefs to
be consistent given the strategies.
Definition 2. A profile (s, B, β) is called a perfect compromise equilibrium if
(a) each player chooses a best compromise in each of her information sets, so for
each φ ∈ Φ, strategy si of player i = i(φ) minimizes her maximum loss at φ:
si(φ) ∈ argmin
xi∈∆(A(φ))
l(xi, s|φ, β), (1)
(b) profile (B, β) of conceivable sets and posteriors is consistent with strategy
profile s.
Remark 1. In some applications, it is unrealistic to assume that players can
choose mixed actions. Our definition of PCE can be easily adjusted if players are
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only allowed to use pure actions. In this case, each player minimizes her maximal
loss among her pure actions, so instead of (1) we require
si(φ) ∈ argmin
ai∈A(φ)
l(ai, s|φ, β). (1′)
2.2. Properties of Perfect Compromise Equilibrium. Let us mention a few
properties of PCE.
First, we establish existence of PCE.
Theorem 1. A perfect compromise equilibrium exists.
The proof is in Appendix A.1.
Second, PCE is equivalent to PBE when there is certainty about the state, so
the game is of complete information. In such a game, where the set of states
Ω is a singleton, conceivable sets are all singletons. So, an action minimizes the
maximum loss of a player if and only if it is a best response.
Third, an ex post Nash equilibrium (if it exists) is a PCE. Here, the term ex
post refers to the game in which the state (or move of nature) is observed by
all. In an ex post Nash equilibrium, regardless of the realized state, each player’s
strategy in each information set is a best response. Thus, the maximum loss in
each information set is zero. No other strategy can further reduce this loss. So,
this is a PCE in which all players have zero losses.
Finally, the concept of PCE respects dominance and iterated dominance. We
say that an action ai ∈ A(φ) at an information set φ is strictly dominated for
player i = i(φ) if there exists a mixed action xi ∈ ∆(A(φ)) such that player i’s
payoff from choosing ai is strictly worse than that from choosing xi, regardless of
the state ω ∈ Ω and of the choices of other players at any of their information
sets. Iterated dominance is defined in a standard way: after having excluded
actions that were strictly dominated in previous rounds, one checks the dominance
condition w.r.t. the remaining actions of each player. Observe that if an action ai
is strictly dominated, then it cannot be a best compromise at the correspondent
information set, and thus it cannot be a part of any PCE. This argument can be
iterated, so any iterated strictly dominated action cannot be a part of any PCE.
3. Examples
We illustrate our solution concept in a few applications that are prominent in
the literature. We consider Cournot and Bertrand duopoly, Spence’s job market
signaling, and bilateral trade. Moreover, in Appendix B we analyze a forecasting
problem and a public good game.
In these applications, actions traditionally belong to an interval or to the positive
reals. The concept of PCE is easily extended to allow for infinite sets. Alterna-
tively, one can discretize the sets of actions and states.
Traditionally, uncertainty is incorporated in such models in a very simple fash-
ion, often only considering two states, high and low. We consider richer (in some
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cases, infinite dimensional) sets of uncertain events in order to capture more real-
istic uncertainty.
3.1. Cournot Duopoly with Unknown Demand. We investigate how two
firms compete in quantities when neither firm knows the demand.
There are two firms that produce a homogeneous good. For clarity of exposition,
we assume that there are no costs of production. Each firm i = 1, 2 chooses a
number of units qi ≥ 0 to produce. Choices are made simultaneously. The firms
face an inverse demand function given by P (q1 + q2). Each firm i’s profit is given
by
ui(qi, q−i;P ) = P (qi + q−i)qi, i = 1, 2.
Neither firm knows the inverse demand P , they only know a set that contains P .
Let
¯
P (q) =
¯
a−
¯
bq and P¯ (q) = a¯− b¯q, where a¯ ≥
¯
a > 0 and a¯/b¯ ≥
¯
a/
¯
b > 0.
We assume that P belongs to the set P of inverse demand functions that satisfy
P (q) is continuously differentiable,
¯
P (q) ≤ P (q) ≤ P¯ (q) and
¯
P ′(q) ≤ P ′(q) ≤ P¯ ′(q). (2)
A firm i’s maximum loss of choosing quantity qi when the other firm chooses
q−i is given by
li(qi, q−i) = sup
P∈P
(
sup
q′i≥0
ui(q
′
i, q−i;P )− ui(qi, q−i;P )
)
.
The maximum loss describes how much more profit firm i could have obtained if it
had known the demand P when anticipating the other firm to produce q−i. Firm
i’s best compromise is a quantity q∗i that achieves the lowest maximum loss for a
given choice q−i of the other firm:
q∗i ∈ argmin
qi≥0
li(qi, q−i).
A strategy profile (q∗1, q
∗
2) is a perfect compromise equilibrium if each firm chooses
a best compromise given the choice of the other firm.
This application can be embedded in our formal setting as described in Section
2. As the demand P is unknown, it is identified as the state. So, the set of
states is P. In the formal game, first nature chooses the state, and then two firms
simultaneously choose their quantities without observing the state. Conceivable
sets and posteriors are trivial, as this is a simultaneous move game with no private
information.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique perfect compromise equilibrium whose strat-
egy profile (q∗1, q
∗
2) is given by
q∗i =
1
3
(√
¯
b+
√
b¯
) ( ¯a√
¯
b
+
a¯√
b¯
)
, i = 1, 2. (3)
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The associated maximum losses are
li(q
∗
i , q
∗
−i) =
(
¯
ab¯− a¯
¯
b)2
4
¯
bb¯
(√
¯
b+
√
b¯
)2 , i = 1, 2. (4)
The proof is in Appendix A.2.
Let us discuss the strategic concerns underlying the PCE in this game. Each
firm i, when deciding about the quantity to produce and facing unknown demand,
worries about two possibilities. It could be that the demand is actually very high,
so the firm is losing profit by producing too little. The greatest such loss occurs
when the demand is the highest, so P = P¯ . Alternatively, it could be that the
demand is actually very low, so the firm is losing profit by producing too much.
The greatest such loss occurs when the demand is the lowest, so P =
¯
P . The firm
thus chooses the best compromise q∗i that balances these two losses, assuming that
the other firm follows its equilibrium strategy q∗−i.
Remark 2. It is generally intractable to find a PBE in this game with such a
rich set of possible demand functions. It can only be done under very specific,
degenerate priors about the demand. For example, PBE can be found if the prior
has support only on linear demand functions, P (q) = a − bq. Note that when
the slope is known, so
¯
b = b¯ = b, and the intercept a is uniformly distributed
on [
¯
a, a¯], then the firms’ strategies in PBE and PCE are identical and given by
q∗1 = q
∗
2 = (¯
a+ a¯)/(6b).
Remark 3. Our equilibrium analysis can shed light on how the firms’ behavior
changes in response to increasing uncertainty. For comparative statics, let us
consider as a benchmark a linear demand function P0(q) = a0−b0q. We normalize
the constants a0 and b0 such that the monopoly profit is equal to 1, that is,
sup
q≥0
(a0 − b0q)q = a
2
0
4b0
= 1.
Suppose that there is a small uncertainty of the magnitude ε about the demand
relative to the benchmark. Specifically, for ε > 0 let P (q) satisfy (2) where
¯
P (q) =
(
1− ε
2
)
a0 −
(
1 +
ε
2
)
b0q and P¯ (q) =
(
1 +
ε
2
)
a0 −
(
1− ε
2
)
b0q.
Denote by qε = (qε1, q
ε
2) the strategies of the PCE as given by Proposition 1. We
then obtain
dqεi
dε
=
2ε
3a0
+O(ε3) > 0.
So the firms optimally respond to the growing uncertainty about the demand by
increasing their output, and do so at an increasing rate as ε grows. Next, consider
the associated maximum losses
li(q
ε
i , q
ε
−i) = ε
2 +O(ε4), i = 1, 2.
Moreover, if ε = 0.1, then li(q
ε
i , q
ε
−i) ≈ 0.01. So the firms lose no more than about
1% of the maximum profit due to not knowing the demand.
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3.2. Bertrand Duopoly with Private Costs. We now consider how two firms
compete in prices when the cost of the rival firm is unknown.
There are two firms that produce a homogeneous good. Each firm i = 1, 2
chooses a price pi. Choices are made simultaneously. The consumers only buy
from the firm that offers a lower price. So the quantity that firm i sells is given
by
qi(pi, p−i) =


Q(pi), if pi < p−i,
Q(pi)/2, if pi = p−i,
0, if pi > p−i,
where Q(p) is the demand function. For clarity of exposition we assume that the
demand function is given by
Q(p) = max
{
a− p
b
, 0
}
The cost producing qi units is ciqi. Each firm i’s profit is given by
ui(pi, p−i; ci) = (pi − ci)qi(pi, p−i), i = 1, 2.
Each firm i knows her own marginal cost ci but not that of the other, and it is
common knowledge that
c1, c2 ∈ [
¯
c, c¯], where 0 ≤
¯
c ≤ c¯ ≤ a/2.
A firm i’s pricing strategy p∗i (ci) describes its choice of the price given its marginal
cost ci.
For each marginal cost ci, firm i’s maximum loss of choosing a price pi when
facing pricing strategy p∗−i of the other firm is given by
li(pi, p
∗
−i; ci) = sup
c−i∈[
¯
c,c¯]
(
sup
p′i≥0
ui(p
′
i, p
∗
−i(c−i); ci)− ui(pi, p∗−i(c−i); ci)
)
.
The maximum loss describes how much more profit i could have obtained if it
had known the other firm’s marginal cost c−i, anticipating the other firm to follow
the pricing strategy p∗−i. Firm i’s best compromise given ci is a price p
∗
i (ci) that
achieves the lowest maximum loss for a given strategy p∗−i of the other firm:
p∗i (ci) ∈ argmin
pi≥0
li(pi, p
∗
−i; ci).
A strategy profile (p∗1, p
∗
2) is a perfect compromise equilibrium if each firm i chooses
a best compromise given its marginal cost ci and the strategy p
∗
−i of the other firm.
This application can be embedded in our formal setting as described in Section
2. As the firms’ marginal costs are not common knowledge, the pair (c1, c2) is
identified as the state. So the set of states is C = [
¯
c, c¯]2. In the formal game, first
nature chooses a state (c1, c2), then each firm i observes its own cost ci, and then
the two firms simultaneously choose their prices. A firm’s conceivable set contains
all cost pairs that include their own cost. The posteriors are trivial, as this is a
simultaneous move game.
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Proposition 2. There exists a unique perfect compromise equilibrium whose strat-
egy profile p∗ = (p∗1, p
∗
2) is given by
p∗i (ci) =
1
2
(
a+ ci −
√
(a− c¯)2 + (c¯− ci)2
)
, i = 1, 2. (5)
The associated maximum losses are
li(p
∗
i (ci), p
∗
−i, ci) =
(a− c¯)(c¯− ci)
2
≤ (a− c¯)(c¯−¯c)
2
, i = 1, 2. (6)
The proof is in Appendix A.3.
Let us discuss the strategic concerns underlying the PCE in this game. Each
firm i, when deciding about the price pi > ci and facing unknown cost of the
other firm, worries about two possibilities. It could be that the other firm chooses
a weakly lower price p−i ≤ pi. Thus, firm i could have obtained more profit
by undercutting p−i. The greatest such loss occurs when the other firm’s price
marginally undercuts pi. Alternatively, it could be that the other firm chooses a
higher price, p−i > pi. Thus, firm i is losing profit by charging too little. The
greatest such loss occurs when the other firm’s cost is the highest possible, c¯.
The firm thus chooses the best compromise p∗i (ci) that balances these two losses,
assuming that the other firm follows its equilibrium strategy.
We find that the PCE price p∗i (ci) is strictly increasing in ci and lies strictly
above its marginal cost ci whenever ci < c¯. Moreover, p
∗
i (c¯) = c¯. So, any sale
with the cost below c¯ leads to a positive profit. The fact that the price does not
lie above c¯ is intuitive. It is common knowledge that the costs are at most c¯, so
if the prices were above c¯, each firm would have incentive to undercut the other,
regardless of what its cost is. Also, the largest price cannot lie below c¯, as a firm
with cost c¯ will charge the price c¯ in order to ensure a loss equal to zero.
Note that the lowest price p∗i (¯
c) is strictly positive, even if
¯
c = 0. This is because
when the price is very low, then the potential loss due to not undercutting the
other firm is small, while the potential loss due to not setting a price much higher
is large. This has an upward effect on prices.
Remark 4. It is generally intractable to find a PBE in this application under any
reasonable prior, even in this simplest setting with linear demand and constant
marginal costs. The PBE strategy profile for this simplest setting is implicitly
defined by a differential equation with no closed form solution (see Spulber, 1995).
Remark 5. As in Section 3.1, our equilibrium analysis can shed light on how the
firms’ behavior changes in response to increasing uncertainty. For comparative
statics, let us consider as a benchmark marginal cost c0 = a/4 (recall that we
require 0 ≤ ci ≤ a/2, so c0 = a/4 is the midpoint). We normalize the constants a
and b of the demand function Q(p) = (a−p)/b such that a = 1 and the monopoly
profit is equal to 1, that is,
sup
p≥0
(p− c0)a− p
b
=
(a− c0)2
4b
= 1.
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Suppose that there is a small uncertainty of the magnitude ε about the private
cost relative to the benchmark. Specifically, for 0 < ε < 1 let ci ∈ [
¯
c, c¯], i = 1, 2,
where
¯
c =
(
1− ε
2
)
c0 and c¯ =
(
1 +
ε
2
)
c0.
Denote by pε = (pε1, p
ε
2) the PCE strategy profile as given by Proposition 2. We
then obtain
dpεi (ci)
dε
=
(a+ ci − 2c¯)c0
4
√
(a− c¯)2 + (c¯− ci)2
> 0,
because, using our assumptions on the parameters,
a+ ci − 2c¯ ≥ a− 2c¯ = 1− 2
(
1 +
ε
2
)
c0 =
1
4
(2− ε) > 0.
So the firms optimally respond to the growing uncertainty about the demand
by increasing their prices. They become less competitive. Next, consider the
associated maximum losses:
li(p
ε
i (ci), p
ε
−i, ci) ≤
3ε
32
− ε
2
64
, i = 1, 2.
Moreover, if ε = 0.1, then the maximum losses are bounded by 0.01. So the firms
lose no more than about 1% of the maximum profit due to not knowing the cost
of the other firm.
3.3. Job Market Signaling. Here we investigate Spence’s job market signaling
when the worker’s cost of education is unknown to the firms.
There is a single worker and two firms. The worker has productivity θ ∈ [0, 1].
The worker publicly chooses a level of education, either low (eL) or high (eH), to
signal her productivity to the firms. The cost of low education is zero. The cost
of high education depends on the worker’s productivity and is given by c(θ). The
firms observe the worker’s education level e and simultaneously offer wages w1 and
w2. The worker chooses the better of the two wages. Her payoff is given by
v(w1, w2, e; θ, c) = max{w1, w2} −
{
0, if e = eL,
c(θ), if e = eH .
Each firm i’s payoff is given by
ui(wi, w−i; θ) =


θ − wi, if wi > w−i,
(θ − wi)/2, if wi = w−i,
0, if wi < w−i.
The worker knows her productivity type θ and the cost of high education c(θ).
The firms know neither. They only know that θ ∈ [0, 1] and that the cost function
c is bounded by two functions,
¯
c and c¯. Specifically, let
¯
c(θ) = 1− bθ and c¯(θ) = 1 + δ − bθ, where 0 ≤ δ < b ≤ 1.
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The firms know that
c(θ) is strictly decreasing,
¯
c(θ) ≤ c(θ) ≤ c¯(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
Define Ω to be the set of all pairs (θ, c) of productivities θ ∈ [0, 1] and cost functions
c(θ) that satisfy (7).
The worker’s strategy e∗(θ, c) describes her choice of the education level for each
pair (θ, c) ∈ Ω. Each firm i’s strategy w∗i (e) describes its wage offer conditional
on each education level e ∈ {eL, eH}. In addition, each firm has a conceivable set
Bi(e). This is the set of all pairs (θ, c) that firm i considers possible after observing
the level of education e ∈ {eL, eH}.
A conceivable set Bi(e) is consistent with the worker’s strategy e
∗ if it includes
all pairs (θ, c) under which the worker chooses e, so (θ, c) ∈ Bi(e) if e∗(θ, c) = e.
For each education level e, firm i’s maximum loss of choosing wage wi when the
other firm chooses the wage according to strategy its w∗−i is given by
li(wi, w
∗
−i; e) = sup
(θ,c)∈Bi(e)
(
sup
w′i≥0
ui(w
′
i, w
∗
−i(e); θ)− ui(wi, w∗−i(e); θ)
)
.
The maximum loss describes how much more profit firm i could have obtained if
it had known the true productivity of the worker, anticipating that the other firm
follows its strategy w∗−i. Firm i’s best compromise given e is a wage w
∗
i (e) that
achieves the lowest maximum loss for a given strategy w∗−i of the other firm:
w∗i (e) ∈ argmin
wi≥0
li(wi, w
∗
−i; e). (8)
Observe that the worker has complete information. There is no need for a com-
promise. So, the worker simply makes a best-response choice:
e∗i (θ, c) ∈ argmax
e∈{eL,eH}
v(w∗1(e), w
∗
2(e), e; θ, c). (9)
A profile (e∗, w∗1, w
∗
2, B1, B2) of strategies and conceivable sets is a perfect com-
promise equilibrium (PCE) if two conditions hold. First, the strategies satisfy (8)
and (9), so each firm i chooses a best compromise, and the worker chooses a best
response to the strategies of the others. Second, the firms’ conceivable sets are
consistent with the worker’s strategy e∗.
This application can be embedded in our formal setting as described in Section
2. As the pair (θ, c) is unknown to the firms, it is identified as the state. So the set
of states is Ω. In the formal game, first nature chooses a state (θ, c) ∈ Ω. Then the
worker observes (θ, c) and chooses an education level e. Finally, the firms observe
the worker’s choice e and simultaneously choose their wages. Conceivable sets for
each firm i are given by Bi. Posteriors are trivial, because the worker plays a pure
strategy, and there are no chance moves.
A PCE is pooling if the worker chooses the same level of education for all (θ, c) ∈
Ω. A PCE is separating if the set Ω can be partitioned into two subsets such that
a different level of education is chosen in each element of the partition.
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Proposition 3. (i) There exists a pooling PCE in which the worker chooses low
education, so
e∗(θ) = eL for all (θ, c) ∈ Ω,
and the firms’ wages are given by
w∗i (eH) = w
∗
i (eL) =
1
2
, i = 1, 2.
After each observed education level e, each firm believes about the worker’s pro-
ductivity that θ ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) If δ ≥ 2b2 − b, then a separating PCE does not exist.
(iii) If δ < 2b2−b, then there exists a separating PCE in which the worker chooses
high education if and only if her cost is at most 1
2b
(b− δ), so for all (θ, c) ∈ Ω
e∗(θ, c) =
{
eH , if c(θ) ≤ 12b(b− δ),
eL, if c(θ) >
1
2b
(b− δ),
and the firms’ wages are given by
w∗i (eH) =
1
2
+
b+ δ
4b2
and w∗i (eL) =
δ
2b
+
b+ δ
4b2
, i = 1, 2. (10)
After each observed education level e, each firm believes about the worker’s pro-
ductivity that
θ ∈
[
0,
b+ δ
2b2
+
δ
b
]
if e = eL, and θ ∈
[
b+ δ
2b2
, 1
]
if e = eH . (11)
The proof is in Appendix A.4.
Let us discuss the strategic concerns underlying these two PCE. In either PCE,
each firm i, when deciding about the wage offer wi and facing unknown productiv-
ity of the worker, worries about two possibilities. It could be that the productivity
is high, so offering a wage that is marginally greater than that of the competitor
would improve profit. The greatest such loss occurs when the productivity is the
highest possible. Alternatively, it could be that the productivity is low, so offering
a wage that is smaller than the competitor’s would cut the loss. The greatest
such loss occurs when the productivity is the lowest possible. The firm thus offers
the best compromise wage that balances these two losses, assuming that the other
firm follows its equilibrium strategy.
In equilibrium, the firms offer the same wage and do not try to outbid each
other, because they can lose equal amounts by stealing the worker for themselves
if she is unproductive and by giving up the worker if she is highly productive.
An essential detail in the above considerations is that the greatest and smallest
productivities are now endogenous and can depend on the level of education e that
the worker chooses. In the pooling equilibrium, e = eL does not provide any useful
information, so all productivity types are possible. However, in the separating
equilibrium, the firms believe that the productivity belongs to a different interval
when observing a different level of education. For example, if b = 1 and δ = 1/4,
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then the firms believe that θ ≤ 7/8 if the education is low, and that θ ≥ 5/8 if
the education is high.
Observe that, among the workers with productivity θ ∈ [5/8, 7/8], some choose
low education, while others choose high education. This overlap is due to the
richness of the state space. The same productivity type θ can have different costs
of education c(θ) that can fall below or above the threshold at which high education
is profitable. Clearly, this result cannot emerge in the traditional setting where
there are only two types of workers.
The parameter δ captures the firms’ uncertainty about the worker’s cost of ed-
ucation conditional on knowing her productivity type. As δ goes up, the range
of productivity types that cannot be identified with a specific cost of education
increases. When δ is sufficiently large, education signaling is not very informa-
tive. A costly signal does not allow to rule out low productivity types, and the
separating PCE does not exist.
3.4. Bilateral Trade with Common Value. We now examine bilateral trade
with common value and private information. In this example we illustrate the role
of the order of moves when traders are asymmetrically informed.1
A seller wants to sell an indivisible good to a buyer. The value v of the good is
the same for each of them. If the good is traded at some price p, then the buyer
obtains v − p and the seller obtains p − v. If the good is not traded, then both
parties obtain zero.
The value v is given by
v =
x+ y
2
, x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [0, 1],
so v ∈ [0, 1]. Only the seller observes x, while neither trader observes y. Thus
x represents the seller’s private information and y represents the common uncer-
tainty among the two traders. Both traders know that x ∈ [0, 1] and y ∈ [0, 1].
We consider the take-it-or-leave-it protocol, in which the proposer can be either
buyer or seller. The protocol is as follows. First, the seller observes her private
information x. Then one trader (proposer) offers a price p ∈ [0, 1]. Finally,
the other trader (responder) observes the price offer and chooses a probability
α ∈ [0, 1] with which the offer is accepted, in which case the trade takes place. If
the offer is not accepted, then the trade does not take place.
This application can be embedded in our formal setting as described in Section
2. We identify the state with (x, y). So the set of states is Ω = [0, 1]2. In the
formal game, first nature chooses a state (x, y). Then the traders proceed as
described in the bargaining protocol. Each trader’s conceivable set contains all
pairs of (x, y) that are possible given the trader’s information. The posteriors are
trivial, because the proposer plays a pure strategy, and there are no chance moves.
1The traditional bilateral trade model with private values and simultaneous offers is analyzed in
Appendix B.1.
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3.4.1. Proposer is Buyer (Uninformed Trader). We first assume that the buyer is
the proposer and the seller is the responder. Because the buyer is uninformed,
her strategy is a choice of a price p ∈ [0, 1]. The seller’s strategy is an acceptance
probability α∗(x, p) that depends on her private information x and the offered
price p. Note that the offer of the buyer does not contain any information about
the value, so there is no signaling.
The seller’s maximum loss of an accepting an offer p with probability α, given
private information x, is
ls(α; x, p) = sup
y∈[0,1]
(
max
{
p− x+ y
2
, 0
}
−
(
p− x+ y
2
)
α
)
.
It describes how much more the seller could have obtained if she knew the missing
information y. The buyer’s maximum loss of offering price p, given the seller’s
acceptance strategy α∗, is
lb(p, α
∗) = sup
(x,y)∈[0,1]2
(
sup
p′∈[0,1]
(
x+ y
2
− p′
)
α∗(x, p′)−
(
x+ y
2
− p
)
α∗(x, p)
)
.
It describes how much more the buyer could have obtained if she knew x and
y, anticipating that the seller would follow her strategy α∗. Each trader’s best
compromise is a choice that achieves the lowest maximum loss for a given strategy
of the other trader. A strategy profile (p∗, α∗) is a perfect compromise equilibrium
if each trader chooses a best compromise given the strategy of the other trader.
Consider first how the seller finds an acceptance probability α as a best com-
promise to a price offer in an abstract setting where the seller believes that the
value is in an interval [v0, v1].
Lemma 1. Let price be p ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose that the seller believes that v ∈ [v0, v1].
Then the seller’s best compromise acceptance probability is
α =


0, if p ≤ v0,
(p− v0)/(v1 − v0), if v0 < p < v1,
1, if p ≥ v1.
The seller’s associated maximum loss is αmax{v1 − p, 0}.
The proof is in Appendix A.5.
The intuition for this result is simple. Of course, if p ≥ v1, then the payoff
p− v is nonnegative for all v ∈ [v0, v1], so the optimal choice is to accept the offer.
Similarly, if p ≤ v0, then the optimal choice is to reject the offer. However, if
v0 < p < v1, then, for a given choice of the acceptance probability α, the seller
worries about two possibilities. First, the value could be smaller than the price,
so p − v > 0. In that case, she could have obtained a better payoff by accepting
the proposal with certainty. The greatest such loss occurs when v = v0, and it is
equal to
(p− v0)− α(p− v0) = (1− α)(p− v0).
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Alternatively, the value could be greater than the price, so p−v < 0. In that case,
she could have obtained a better payoff by rejecting the proposal with certainty,
and thus getting zero. The greatest such loss occurs when v = v1, and it is equal
to
0− α(p− v1) = α(v1 − p).
The seller chooses α as a best compromise to balances these two losses, that is, α
solves the equation (1− α)(p− v0) = α(v1 − p).
We now present a PCE of this game.
Proposition 4. There exists a perfect compromise equilibrium, in which the buyer
offers p∗ = 1/4, and the seller accepts the offer with probability
α∗(x, p) =


0, if x ≥ 2p,
2p− x, if 2p− 1 < x < 2p,
1, if x ≤ 2p− 1.
(12)
The proof is in Appendix A.6.
Under this PCE, trade can occurs with positive probability. The seller accepts
the equilibrium offer of 1/4 with probability max{1/2− x, 0}.
Let us discuss how this PCE is computed. In the second stage, the seller,
who has observed x and p and has no information about y ∈ [0, 1], believes that
v = (x + y)/2 belongs to the interval [x/2, (1 + x)/2]. Therefore, her acceptance
strategy α∗ is given by Lemma 1 with [v0, v1] = [x/2, (1 + x)/2].
In the first stage, the buyer considers different possible realizations of the com-
mon uncertainty y and of the seller’s private information x. As the price goes up,
on the one hand the buyer’s gain from trade decreases, but on the other hand, the
probability that the seller accepts this price increases. Unlike in our earlier exam-
ples, here the computation of the maximum loss involves more than just checking
the extreme cases. However, notice that the price should not be too low, as this
offer is likely to be rejected, so the buyer has a high loss when the common value
of the good is high. The price should not be too high either, as this offer is likely
to be accepted, so the buyer has a high loss when the common value of the good
is low. As best compromise, the buyer chooses the price that balances these two
considerations, anticipating the seller’s equilibrium behavior in the second stage.
3.4.2. Proposer is Seller (Informed Trader). Now we assume that the seller is
the proposer and the buyer is the responder. Because the seller observes x, her
pricing strategy p∗(x) depends upon x. The buyer then responds by an acceptance
probability α∗(p) that depends on the offered price p.
Unlike when the buyer was the proposer, here the seller’s price can be informa-
tive about the seller’s private information x. Let B(p) be the buyer’s conceivable
set that describes what pairs of (x, y) the buyer considers possible after observing
the seller’s move. A conceivable set B(p) is consistent with the seller’s strategy p∗
if it includes all pairs (x, y) under which the seller chooses p, so (x, y) ∈ B(p) if
p∗(x) = p.
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The buyer’s maximum loss from accepting p with probability α is
lb(α; p) = sup
(x,y)∈B(p)
(
max
{
x+ y
2
− p, 0
}
−
(
x+ y
2
− p
)
α
)
.
The seller’s maximum loss of offering price p, given her private information x and
the buyer’s acceptance strategy α∗, is
ls(p, α
∗; x) = sup
y∈[0,1]
(
sup
p′∈[0,1]
(
p′ − x+ y
2
)
α∗(p′)−
(
p− x+ y
2
)
α∗(p)
)
.
Each trader’s best compromise is a choice that achieves the lowest maximum loss
for a given strategy of the trader. A strategy profile (p∗, α∗) is a perfect compromise
equilibrium if each trader chooses a best compromise given the strategy of the other
trader, and the buyer’s conceivable sets are consistent.
We now present a PCE. In the proposition below, instead of expressing what
pairs (x, y) the buyer includes in the conceivable set, we simply state what values
of v = (x+ y)/2 the buyer considers as conceivable.
Proposition 5. There exists a perfect compromise equilibrium in which the seller’s
offer is
p∗(x) = 3/4 for all x ∈ [0, 1],
the buyer believes that v ∈ [0, 1] after observing p = 3/4 and that v ∈ [0, 1/2] after
observing p 6= 3/4, and her acceptance probability is
α∗(p) =
{
1/4, if p = 3/4,
max{1− 2p, 0} if p 6= 3/4.
The proof is in Appendix A.7.
This PCE is pooling, in the sense that the equilibrium behavior is independent of
the seller’s private information. In the second stage, the buyer, who has observed
p, knows that in equilibrium the seller must choose p = 3/4. This price reveals no
information about x. So the buyer cannot rule out any values, thus believing that
v ∈ [0, 1]. The buyer’s acceptance strategy is derived analogously to the seller’s
in Lemma 1. So, the buyer accepts the offer with probability 1/4. Alternatively,
if the buyer observes p 6= 3/4, which cannot happen in equilibrium, then there
are no constraints on what values are conceivable. In this case the equilibrium
conceivable set is specified to be such that x = 0 and y ∈ [0, 1]. The buyer thus
believes that v ∈ [0, 1/2] and accepts the offer with probability max{1− 2p, 0}.
In the first stage, the seller observes x, but still faces different possible realiza-
tions of the common uncertainty y. She anticipates the buyer’s acceptance of the
price of p = 3/4 with probability 1/4, and the acceptance of a price p 6= 3/4 with
probability max{1− 2p, 0}. The price of 3/4 has the property that the maximum
loss of choosing p = 3/4 is never greater than the maximum loss of choosing any
other price, regardless of the seller’s private value x.
3.4.3. Discussion. Propositions 4 and 5 stand in stark contrast to the no-trade
theorem under common values as predicted by PBE (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).
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We observe that trade can happen with a positive probability in a PCE. This is
true when the (uninformed) buyer is the proposer as well as when the (informed)
seller is the proposer. When the buyer is the proposer, the probability of trade is
α∗(x, p∗) = max{1/2− x, 0} > 0 for all x < 1/2. When the seller is the proposer,
the probability of trade is 1/4, regardless of the seller’s private information. The
trade is possible because the traders cannot rule out the possibility of two opposing
contingencies: winning and losing from trade. They do not want to miss a winning
opportunity, but also they do not want to lose from trade. They compromise by
trading with a positive probability when the informed trader moves first, as well
as in many cases when the uninformed trader moves first.
4. Conclusion
We introduce the concept of perfect compromise equilibrium (PCE) as an alter-
native to perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for solving sequential games when
there is uncertainty about some of the primitives. These primitives can be specific
characteristics of other players or the environment in which the game takes place.
Traditionally, following Harsanyi (1967), such uncertainty is reduced to risk. A
state is introduced to capture the details underlying this uncertainty. At the out-
set of the game a move of nature determines this state. This move is drawn from
a distribution that is commonly known among the players in the game. We follow
the same approach except for the last assumption, and assume instead that the
distribution determining the state is unknown.
With our concept, dynamic strategic decision making can be illustrated in the
traditional fashion with a game tree. Beliefs are added whenever an information
set contains more than one node. This allows to evaluate choices at information
sets that cannot be reached. These beliefs are conditional on a state to separate
what can happen in the different states. Bayes’ rule is still in place, applying
conditional on a state. A set of conceivable states is added to each information set
in order to track any resolution of uncertainty. The concept of best compromise
determines how to evaluate a strategy when looking at its performance across
different conceivable states. This stands in contrast to the classic PBE setting
where strategies are evaluated using a prior over the different states.
The description of the state governs the type of uncertainty that is modeled.
States can describe values of market participants, thereby allowing for many differ-
ent possible environments. They can specify distributions of such values in some
small neighborhood, thereby modeling slight uncertainty around a given under-
standing of the world. States can also include features of the choices of a player,
thereby incorporating strategic uncertainty into the analysis. In particular, our
assumption of strategic certainty comes without loss of generality. Any uncer-
tainty can be captured in the definition of a state. The common strategy profile
describes all details that can be predicted if the state were known, provided this
strategy profile is common knowledge.
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Uncertainty seems to mean that details are hard to describe. And yet traditional
models focus on two types of workers, high and low, or assume linear demand
functions. Uncertainty seems to preclude that players agree on likelihoods of
uncertain events and yet this is done in PBE. PCE opens the door to understanding
more realistic uncertainty.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our solution concept in relevant economic ex-
amples. The underlying game trees are simple while the uncertainty is rich. This
richness, such as allowing for any demand function in a neighborhood, precludes
a tractable analysis of PBE. PCE yields tractable results with simple proofs as
players focus on extreme situations, allowing them to ignore intermediate constel-
lations. New insights come to light.
The traditional PBE framework reveals a different solution for each prior. Such
flexibility can be useful to fit data. But flexibility in terms of a multitude of
different answers gives little guidance to those who need to make choices. One
easily looses the big picture if there are many details that determine what happens.
On a more abstract level, traditional PBE analysis reveals parsimonious results
by limiting attention to only few types of players. In contrast, PCE generates
parsimonious results by forcing players to find a compromise in many different
situations.
Acceptance of the common knowledge assumption is dwindling. The literature
on decision making and game playing under uncertainty has now developed al-
ternative concepts. We hope to add to this literature. Numerous paths to future
research open up in a search for new insights and for a clearer exposition of existing
understanding of economic and strategic principles.
Appendix A. Proofs.
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that the strategy s0 of the nonstrategic
player 0 is fully mixed. This is without loss of generality, as any zero-probability
action of player 0 can be removed from the game tree.
We now introduce the notion of feasibility. A state ω is feasible at information
set φ ∈ Φ if there exists a path in the game tree G from the initial node φ0 to φ
in which nature chooses ω at φ0. Let B¯(φ) be the set of all feasible states at φ.
Let Ss0 be the set of strategy profiles s where the strategy of the nonstrategic
player 0 is exogenously given by s0. Let conceivable sets be equal to feasible sets,
B(φ) = B¯(φ) for all φ ∈ Φ. This profile of conceivable sets is consistent with
every strategy profile s ∈ Ss0 (see Definition 1). Let B be the set of belief systems
β = (βω)ω∈Ω.
We now argue that there exists a PCE (s, B¯, β) where s ∈ Ss0 and β ∈ B. Note
that we fix the profile of conceivable sets to be equal to B¯.
Consider an arbitrary (s, B¯, β) that satisfies s ∈ Ss0 and β ∈ B. Let (s′φ, s−φ)
denote the strategy profile where s′φ ∈ ∆(A(φ)) is played at information set φ
and s−φ is the profile of strategies at all information sets other than φ. For each
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information set φ ∈ Φ let Uφ(s; β) be the negative of the maximum loss at φ, so
Uφ(s; β) = − sup
ω∈B¯(φ)
(
sup
aφ∈A(φ)
u¯i(aφ, s−φ;φ, ω, βω)− u¯i(sφ, s−φ;φ, ω, βω)
)
.
We now construct an augmented game (Φ,G, U, s0, µ) as follows. Let each in-
formation set φ ∈ Φ be associated with a different player, so the set of players is
the set of information sets Φ. The game tree G remains unchanged. Nature moves
first by choosing a state ω ∈ Ω = A(φ0) in the initial node φ0. We now model the
choice of nature by a given distribution µ over the states. We assume that µ has
full support over nature’s actions in Ω. Each player φ ∈ Φ moves only once, at
her information set φ, by choosing an action from the set A(φ).
A strategy profile s describes a choice sφ ∈ ∆(A(φ)) of each player φ. For each
information set φ that belongs to the nonstrategic player 0 in the original game, the
strategy at φ is exogenously given by s0(φ). A posterior βω(φ) is the probability
distribution over decision nodes in φ conditional on state ω. The interim payoff of
each player φ ∈ Φ at the information set φ is given by Uφ(s; β), and U = (Uφ)φ∈Φ.
The augmented game (Φ,G, U, s0, µ) can be seen as a game of incomplete in-
formation with a nonstandard specification of the players’ payoffs. While in a
standard game the payoffs are ex post and specified at each terminal node, in this
augmented game the payoff Uφ of each player φ ∈ Φ is interim and specified at the
information set where the player makes a move. Because each player moves only
once, the specification of the interim payoffs is sufficient to apply the concept of
PBE or sequential equilibrium to the augmented game.
Another nonstandard feature of the augmented game is that each player’s in-
terim payoff Uφ(s; β) is independent of nature’s choice ω. That is, for each state
ω ∈ B¯(φ) the interim payoff Uφ(s; β) at φ is the same, and for each state ω 6∈ B¯(φ)
the information set φ cannot be reached. So, nature’s distribution over states µ
does not affect the best-response actions by the players, it only affects the likeli-
hood of reaching different information sets in the game tree.
Observe that maximizing Uφ(s
′
φ, s−φ; β) with respect to player φ’s own decision
s′φ ∈ ∆(A(φ)) is the same as minimizing the maximum loss at φ in the original
game. Consequently, if (s∗, β∗) is a sequential equilibrium of the augmented game,
then (s∗, B¯, β∗) is a PCE of the original game. The existence of PCE follows from
the existence of sequential equilibrium for finite games. We refer the reader to
Chakrabarti and Topolyan (2016) for the backward-induction proof of existence
of sequential equilibrium that uses interim payoffs at information sets to determine
players’ best-response correspondences. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 1. For derivations, we assume that the quantities
and the price are always nonnegative, and then we verify that this is indeed the
case in equilibrium.
Let x∗i (q−i, P ) be a best response strategy of player i given the knowledge of q−i
and the inverse demand function P . The loss of firm i from choosing quantity qi,
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given q−i and P , is denoted by ∆ui(qi, q−i;P ) and given by
∆ui(qi, q−i;P ) = P (x
∗
i (q−i, P ) + q−i)x
∗
i (q−i, P )− P (qi + q−i)qi.
By (2), the marginal revenue of firm i satisfies
¯
P (qi+q−i)+
¯
P ′(qi+q−i)qi ≤ P (qi+q−i)+P ′(qi+q−i)qi ≤ P¯ (qi+q−i)+P¯ ′(qi+q−i)qi.
Therefore, for given qj and P , the best-response quantity x
∗
i (q−i, P ) of firm i
always lies between x∗i (q−i, ¯
P ) and x∗i (q−i, P¯ ). While the profit function need not
be concave in general, it is concave when P =
¯
P or when P = P¯ . So the highest
loss will always be attained in one of these two extreme cases:
li(qi, q−i) = sup
P
∆ui(qi, q−i;P ) = max{∆ui(qi, q−i;
¯
P ),∆ui(qi, q−i; P¯ )}.
It is easy to see that the maximum loss is minimized by balancing the two expres-
sions under the maximum:
∆ui(qi, q−i; P¯ ) = ∆ui(qi, q−i;
¯
P ).
Substituting
¯
P and P¯ and simplifying the expressions yields the equation
(a¯− b¯q−i)2
4b¯
− (a¯− b¯(qi + q−i))qi = (¯a−¯bq−i)
2
4
¯
b
− (
¯
a−
¯
b(qi + q−i))qi. (13)
Solving for qi yields
q∗i = ¯
a
√
b¯+ a¯
√
¯
b
2(
¯
b
√
b¯+ b¯
√
¯
b)
− qj
2
, i = 1, 2.
Solving this pair of equations for (q∗1, q
∗
2), we find (3). It is easy to verify that under
our assumptions, q∗i > 0, and moreover, P (q
∗
1+ q
∗
2) ≥ ¯P (q
∗
1+ q
∗
2) > 0. Substituting
the solution into (13) yields the maximum loss of each firm (4). 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2. For derivations, we assume that each firm prices
at or above marginal cost, and then we verify that this is indeed the case in
equilibrium.
Consider firm i with type ci ∈ [
¯
c, c¯]. Let pm(ci) be the monopoly price, so
pm(ci) = (a + ci)/2. Since we have assumed that c¯ ≤ a/2, this means that
pm(ci) ≥ c¯ for all ci. The monopoly profit is (a− ci)2/(4b).
Fix the other firm’s strategy p∗−i(c−i) and let p¯ be the maximum price of the
other firm, so p¯ = supc−i∈[
¯
c,c¯] p
∗
−i(c−i). Given the other firm’s cost c−i, and thus
the price p−i = p
∗
−i(c−i), firm i’s maximum profit is
u∗i (p−i; ci) = sup
xi≥0
ui(xi, p−i; ci) =


0, if p−i ≤ ci,
(p−i − ci)a−p−ib , if ci < p−i ≤ pm(ci),
(a−ci)2
4b
, if p−i > p
m(ci)
= max
{
0, (p−i − ci)a− p−i
b
,
(a− ci)2
4b
}
.
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Let pi be a price of firm i. We now find the maximum loss of firm i from choosing
pi, given its marginal cost ci and the strategy p
∗
−i of the other firm. There are
three cases.
First, suppose that p−i ≤ ci ≤ pi. Then firm i cannot make positive profit, so pi
is a best response. Thus, firm i behaves optimally in this case, so the loss is zero.
Second, suppose that ci < p−i ≤ pi. Then firm i could have been better off by
marginally undercutting p−i. Maximizing the loss over p−i ∈ (ci, pi], we obtain
sup
p−i∈(ci,pi)
(u∗i (p−i; ci)− ui(pi, p−i; ci)) =
{
(pi − ci)a−pib , if pi ≤ pm(ci),
(a−ci)
2
4b
, if pi > p
m(ci).
(14)
Third, suppose that pi < p−i. Then firm i could have made more profit by
increasing its price, so its maximum loss is
sup
p−i∈(pi,p¯]
(u∗i (p−i; ci)− ui(pi, p−i; ci)) = u∗i (p¯;ci)− ui(pi, p¯; ci)
= −(pi − ci)a− pi
b
+
{
(p¯− ci)a−p¯b , if pi ≤ pm(ci),
(a−ci)2
4b
, if pi > p
m(ci).
(15)
To minimize the maximum loss, we need to minimize the greater of the expressions
in (14) and (15). Observe that, by the definition of pm(ci), the right-hand side
in (14) is constant and the right-hand side in (15) is strictly increasing in pi for
pi > p
m(ci). So we only need to consider pi ≤ pm(ci). Under this assumption, the
greater of the expressions in (14) and (15) can be simplified to
li(pi, p
∗
−i; ci) = max
{
(pi − ci)a− pi
b
, (p¯− ci)a− p¯
b
− (pi − ci)a− pi
b
}
.
Because one expression is increasing and the other is decreasing in pi for pi ≤
pm(ci), the maximum loss is minimized at the solution of
(pi − ci)a− pi
b
= (p¯− ci)a− p¯
b
− (pi − ci)a− pi
b
. (16)
Solving the above for p∗i (ci), we obtain (5).
To see that p∗i (ci) ≥ ci, observe that
p∗i (ci)− ci =
1
2
(
a− ci −
√
(a− c¯)2 + (c¯− ci)2
)
≥ 0
by the triangle inequality and a > c¯ ≥ ci. Moreover, p∗i (ci) > ci when ci < c¯, and
p∗i (c¯) = c¯. Finally, substituting p
∗
i (ci) into the maximum loss expression in (16)
yields (6). 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 3. First we find the equilibrium wages wH and wL
after the worker’s level of education eH and eL. For each j = L,H , the firms have
a conceivable set B(ej) ⊂ Ω, that is, the set of states (θ, c) ∈ Ω that the firms
consider possible. Let
¯
θj and θ¯j be the lowest and highest productivity levels given
ej , so
¯
θj = inf{θ : (θ, c) ∈ B(ej)} and θ¯j = sup{θ : (θ, c) ∈ B(ej)}, j = L,H. (17)
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Consider a firm i, some wages wi and w−i, and a state (θ, c). Firm i’s maximum
profit u∗i (w−i; θ) is obtained by marginally outbidding w−i when it is below θ, and
by choosing the wage below w−i and thus giving up the worker if θ ≤ w−i, so
u∗i (w−i; θ) = sup
wi≥0
ui(wi, w−i; θ) = max{θ − w−i, 0}.
Observe that we only need to consider wi and w−i in [
¯
θj , θ¯j ]. A wage above θ¯j
is dominated and cannot be a best compromise; a wage below
¯
θj will always be
overbid by the rival’s wage, as there is common knowledge that θ ≥
¯
θj .
Suppose that wi < w−i, so ui(wi, w−i; θ) = 0. Then the largest loss is obtained
when θ is the greatest:
sup
θ:(θ,c)∈B(ej)
(u∗i (w−i; θ)− ui(wi, w−i; θ)) ≤ max{θ¯j − w−i, 0}.
Next, suppose that wi > w−i, so ui(wi, w−i; θ) = θ − wi. Then the largest loss is
obtained when θ is the smallest:
sup
θ:(θ,c)∈B(ej)
(u∗i (w−i; θ)− ui(wi, w−i; θ)) = max{θ − w−i, 0} − (θ − wi) ≤ wi − ¯θj.
Finally, suppose that wi = w−i, so ui(wi, w−i; θ) = (θ − wi)/2. Then
sup
θ:(θ,c)∈B(ej)
(u∗i (w−i; θ)− ui(wi, w−i; θ)) = max{θ − w−i, 0} −
θ − wi
2
≤ max{0, θ¯j − w−i, (wi −
¯
θj)/2}.
The maximum loss li(wi, w−i) is given by the greatest of the three expressions, so
li(wi, w−i) = max{0, θ¯j − w−i, wi −
¯
θj.}.
The wages wi that minimizes the maximum loss satisfies
wi = θ¯j +
¯
θj − w−i, i = 1, 2.
So, we have obtained two equations, one for each i = 1, 2. Solving this pair of
equations for w1 and w2 yields the best compromise w
∗
i (ej) for each firm i, where
w∗i (ej) =
θ¯j +
¯
θj
2
, i = 1, 2. (18)
The associated maximum losses are
li(w
∗
i (ej), w
∗
−i(ej)) = w
∗
i (ej)− ¯θj . (19)
Next, observe that the worker operates under complete information. Given each
choice of ej , she anticipates the wages w
j = w∗1(ej) = w
∗
2(ej), j ∈ {L,H}. So,
given a state (θ, c), the worker chooses e = eH if and only if
2
wH − c(θ) ≥ wL.
2The tie breaking is arbitrary, because the set of types is a continuum.
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Recall that c(θ) is strictly decreasing, and denote by c−1 its inverse. Then, the
worker chooses e = eH if and only if her type θ satisfies
θ ≥ c−1(wH − wL).
Pooling PCE. If wH ≤ wL, then every type chooses low level of education eL, so
the equilibrium is pooling. After observing e = eL, the consistent conceivable set
BL is thus the entire set of states, BL = Ω. By (7), the highest and lowest θ in BL
are θ¯L = 1 and
¯
θL = 0. By (18), we obtain the equilibrium wages wi(eL) = 1/2.
After observing an out-of-equilibrium education e = eH , the conceivable set BH
must induce the wage w∗i (eH) ≤ w∗i (eL). In particular, we can assume BH = Ω,
and thus w∗i (eH) = 1/2.
Substituting the wage of w∗i (e) = 1/2 and the lower bound productivity ¯
θL = 0
into (19), we obtain the maximum loss for each firm i,
li(w
∗
i (ej), w
∗
−i; ej) =
1
2
, i = 1, 2, j = L,H.
Separating PCE. Consider now wH > wL, so that the worker with cost c(θ) ≤
wH − wL chooses high education. Let
BL = {(θ, c) ∈ Ω : c > wH − wL} and BH = {(θ, c) ∈ Ω : c(θ) ≤ wH − wL}
be the conceivable sets of each firm when the level of education is eL and eH ,
respectively. So, BL and BH contain all pairs (θ, c) such that low and high edu-
cation is chosen, respectively. These sets thus satisfy the consistency requirement
(Definition 1).
By (7) and (17), the highest and lowest θ in BH are given by
θ¯H = 1 and
¯
θH =
¯
c−1(wH − wL) = 1− w
H + wL
b
. (20)
Similarly, the highest and lowest θ in BL are given by
θ¯L = c¯
−1(wH − wL) = 1 + δ − w
H + wL
b
and
¯
θL = 0. (21)
From (18), we have
wH =
θ¯H +
¯
θH
2
and wL =
θ¯L +
¯
θL
2
. (22)
Solving the system of six equations in (20), (21), and (22), with six unknowns
(wH , wL, θ¯H ,
¯
θH , θ¯L, and
¯
θL), we obtain the equilibrium wages and the bounds
on the productivity types as shown in (10) and (11).
Observe that the lowest possible cost of high education is inf{c(θ) : (θ, c) ∈
Ω} =
¯
c−1(1) = 1 − b. Therefore, there exist states (θ, c) where high education eH
is chosen if and only if wH − wL > 1 − b. Substituting our solution for wH and
wL given by (10), we obtain that wH − wL > 1− b if and only if
δ < 2b2 − b.
This condition is thus necessary and sufficient for the existence of separating PCE.
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Finally, substituting the wage wH and the productivity lower bound
¯
θH into
(19), we obtain firm i’s maximum loss when e = eH ,
li(w
∗
i (eH), w
∗
−i(eH); eH) = w
H −
¯
θH =
1
2
− b+ δ
4b2
.
Substituting the wage wL and the productivity lower bound
¯
θL into (19), we obtain
the maximum loss when e = eL,
li(w
∗
i (eL), w
∗
−i(eL); eL) = w
L −
¯
θL =
δ
2b
+
b+ δ
4b2
. 
A.5. Proof of Lemma 1. Let p be an offered price and let α be an acceptance
probability. The seller’s payoff in case of trade at price p is p− v. If p ≤ v0, then
this payoff is nonpositive for all v ∈ [v0, v1]. The seller can achieve the best payoff
(and thus zero maximum loss) by rejecting the proposal, so α = 0. Similarly, if
p ≥ v1, then the seller’s payoff from accepting p is nonnegative for all v ∈ [v0, v1].
The seller can achieve the best payoff (and thus zero maximum loss) by accepting
the proposal, so α = 1.
Suppose that v0 < p < v1. For each v ∈ [v0, p], the best payoff is p− v, so the
loss from choosing α is
(p− v)− α(p− v) = (1− α)(p− v) ≤ (1− α)(p− v0).
For each v ∈ [p, v1], the best payoff is 0, so the loss from choosing α is
0− α(p− v) = α(v − p) ≤ α(v1 − p).
Thus, the maximum loss is
l(p, α; v) = max{(1− α)(p− v0), α(v1 − p)}.
The first term is decreasing and the second term is increasing in α. The maximum
loss is thus minimized by the solution of (1 − α)(p − v0) = α(v1 − p), so α =
(p− v0)/(v1 − v0). 
A.6. Proof of Proposition 4. Let us find a conceivable set and a strategy of
the seller in the second stage for our PCE. The seller, who has observed x and p
and has no information about y ∈ [0, 1], has a conceivable set B(x, p). Let B(x, p)
contain all states that cannot be ruled out given this information, so
B(x, p) = {(x′, y′) ∈ [0, 1]2 : x′ = x, y′ ∈ [0, 1]}.
So, B(x, p) is consistent (Definition 1). Values are thus contained in{
x+ y
2
: (x, y) ∈ B(x, p)
}
= [x/2, (1 + x)/2].
By Lemma 1, with [v0, v1] = [x/2, (1 + x)/2], the seller’s acceptance strategy
α∗(x, p) is given by (12).
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We now find the buyer’s strategy in the first stage. The buyer’s maximum payoff
given (x, y) is
sup
p′∈[0,1]
(
x+ y
2
− p′
)
α∗(x, p′) =
y2
8
.
Let p be a price. The buyer’s loss from choosing p, given (x, y), is given by
y2
8
−
(
x+ y
2
− p
)
α∗(x, p) ≤ max
{
1
8
−
(
x+ 1
2
− p
)
α∗(x, p),−
(x
2
− p
)
α∗(x, p)
}
=


1
8
, if x ≥ 2p,
1
2
(2p− x)2 +max{1
8
− p+ x
2
, 0
}
, if 2p− 1 < x < 2p,
p− x
2
, if x ≤ 2p− 1.
(23)
The inequality follows from convexity of the loss in y, so we can evaluate it at
y = 1 and y = 0, and the equality is by the substitution of α∗(x, p) from (12).
Observe that (23) is convex in x for x < 2p and constant for x ≥ 2p. So to
maximize it w.r.t. x, we only need to evaluate it at x = 0 and x = 1. It is then
straightforward to see that p∗ = 1/4 minimizes the buyer’s maximum loss, which
is equal to 1/8.
Finally, by Lemma 1, we can find the seller’s maximum loss. We thus find that
the maximum losses of the buyer (proposer) and seller (responder) are
lb(p
∗, α∗) =
1
8
and max
x∈[0,1]
ls(p
∗, α∗; x) =
1
8
. 
A.7. Proof of Proposition 5. Let us first determine a conceivable set and the
best compromise acceptance strategy α∗(p) for the buyer in the second stage in
our PCE. The derivation is analogous Lemma 1. Specifically, let v ∈ [v0, v1]. The
buyer’s payoff in case of trade is v − p. If p ≥ v1, then the buyer’s payoff is
nonpositive for all v ∈ [v0, v1]. The buyer can achieve the best payoff (and thus
the maximum loss equal to zero) by rejecting the proposal, so α∗(p) = 0. Similarly,
if p ≤ v0, then the buyer’s payoff is nonnegative for all v ∈ [v0, v1]. The buyer can
achieve the best payoff (and thus the maximum loss equal to zero) by accepting
the proposal, so α∗(p) = 1.
Suppose that v0 < p < v1. For each p ≤ v, the best payoff is v − p, so the loss
from accepting p with probability α is
(v − p)− α(v − p) = (1− α)(v − p) ≤ (1− α)(v1 − p).
For each p ≥ v, the best payoff is 0, so the loss from accepting p with probability
α is
0− α(v − p) = α(p− v) ≤ α(p− v0).
Thus, the maximum loss is
l(p, α; v) = max{(v1 − α)(1− p), α(p− v0)}. (24)
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The first term is decreasing and the second term is increasing in α. The maximum
loss is thus minimized by the solution of (1 − α)(v1 − p) = α(p− v0), so α∗(p) =
(v¯ − p)/(v¯ −
¯
v).
The buyer knows that the seller chooses p∗ = 3/4 for all x ∈ [0, 1], so this price
bears no information about x. Thus, the buyer who has observed p∗ = 3/4 has
a conceivable set that contains all states, so B(p∗) = Ω. The interval of values is
thus [v0, v1] = [0, 1]. The buyer’s best compromise acceptance probability is
α∗ (3/4) =
v1 − 3/4
v1 − v0 =
1
4
.
Next, any price p 6= 3/4 is out of equilibrium. The buyer’s conceivable set in
this case is set to B(p) = {(0, y) : y ∈ [0, 1]}. The interval of values is thus
[v0, v1] = [0, 1/2]. Note that p ≥ v0 = 0. The buyer’s best compromise acceptance
probability is
α∗ (p) = max
{
v1 − p
v1 − v0 , 0
}
= max{1− 2p, 0}, p 6= 3/4.
We now find the seller’s best compromise strategy in the first stage. Anticipating
the buyer to play α∗, the seller can obtain the following payoffs. Given v =
(x+ y)/2, the seller’s payoff is from p∗ = 3/4 is
uˆs(v, p
∗) = (p∗ − v)α∗(p∗) =
(
3
4
− v
)
1
4
.
The seller’s payoff is from p 6= 3/4 is
uˆs(v, p) = (p− v)α∗(p) =
{
(p− v) (1− 2p), if p < 1/2,
0, if p ≥ 1/2, p 6= 3/4.
The maximum payoff among all prices p 6= 3/4 is
sup
p 6=3/4
uˆs(v, p) ≥
{
1
8
(1− 2v)2, if v < 1/2,
0, if v ≥ 1/2.
The maximum loss of choosing p 6= 3/4 is thus greater than or equal to
sup
v∈[x
2
, 1+x
2
]
(uˆs(v, p
∗)− uˆs(v, p)) ≥ sup
v∈[x
2
, 1+x
2
]
(
1
8
(1− 2v)2 −
(
3
4
− v
)
1
4
)
=
3
32
>
1
16
.
On the other hand, the maximum loss of choosing p∗ = 3/4 satisfies
ls(p
∗, a∗; x) = sup
v∈[x
2
, 1+x
2
]
(
sup
p 6=3/4
uˆs (v, p)− uˆs (v, p∗)
)
= sup
v∈[x
2
, 1+x
2
]
(
1
8
(1− 2v)2 −
(
3
4
− v
)
1
4
)
. (25)
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It can be seen that the expression under the maximum in (25) is convex, so it
needs to be evaluated at y = 0 and y = 1. So, for all x ∈ [0, 1],
ls(p
∗, a∗; x) = max
{
2x2 − 2x− 1
16
,
2x− 1
16
}
=
2x− 1
16
≤ 1
16
.
We thus conclude that choosing p∗ = 3/4 gives a lower maximum loss than choos-
ing p 6= 3/4, regardless of x ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, p∗ = 3/4 is a best compromise. The
maximum losses of the seller (proposer) and buyer (responder) thus satisfy
max
x∈[0,1]
ls(p
∗, α∗; x) =
1
16
and lb(p
∗, α∗) =
3
16
. 
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Appendix B (For Online Publication)
In this appendix we analyze three examples that complement those presented
in the main part of the paper.
B.1. Bilateral Trade with Simultaneous Offers. We continue the theme of
bilateral trade in Section 3.4. This time, we consider the classic model of trade
with private values and simultaneous moves (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983). A
seller wants to sell an indivisible good to a buyer. The good has value vs for the
seller and vb for the buyer. Each trader is privately informed about their own
value, and it is commonly known that both values belong to [0, 1].
Trade is organized using a double auction. The seller and the buyer simultane-
ously submit bids, s and b, respectively, with s, b ∈ [0, 1]. If s ≤ b, then the good
is sold at the price p = (s + b)/2, so the seller and the buyer obtain the payoffs
of p − vs and vb − p, respectively. If s > b, then the good is not sold, and both
parties obtain zero payoffs.
Let s(vs) and b(vb) denote the seller’s and the buyer’s strategies, respectively.
We now find a perfect compromise equilibrium under the following regularity con-
dition:
Strategies s(vs) and b(vb) are continuous and strictly increasing. (A1)
We now present a PCE of this game.
Proposition 6. A pair of strategies (s∗, b∗) that satisfies (A1) is a PCE if and
only if for all vs, vb ∈ [0, 1]
s∗(vs) = max
{
vs,
1
4
+
2vs
3
}
and b∗(vb) = min
{
vb,
1
12
+
2vb
3
}
. (26)
The associated maximal losses are
ls(vs) = max
{
1
4
− vs
12(1− vs) , 0
}
≤ 1
4
and lb(vb) = max
{
1
4
− 1− vb
12vb
, 0
}
≤ 1
4
.
The PCE in Proposition 6 coincides with the PBE when vb and vs are uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] (Chatterjee and Samuelson, 1983).
Proof. Denote by s∗(vs) and b
∗(vb) the strategies of the seller and the buyer in a
best compromise equilibrium. Also, denote
¯
s∗ = inf
vs∈[0,1]
s∗(vs) and b¯
∗ = sup
vb∈[0,1]
b∗(vb).
Suppose that the seller’s value is vs. Let us find the seller’s maximum loss for
bidding s. If vs < b¯
∗, so there is a potential gain from trade when the buyer’s bid
b∗(vb) is high enough, then there are two outcomes that the seller worries about.
First, it is s < b∗(vb), so the seller could have made a greater bid, s
′ = b∗(vb), and
sold the good at a higher price, thus obtaining a payoff increment of
sup
vb
[(
b∗(vb)− vs
)− (s+ b∗(vb)
2
− vs
)]
=
b¯∗ − s
2
.
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Second, it is s > b∗(vb) > vs, so the good is not sold, but the seller could have made
a smaller bid, s′ = b∗(vb), and sold the good, thus obtaining a payoff increment of
sup
vb
[b∗(vb)− vs] = s− vs.
The seller’s maximum loss is thus
cs(vs, s, b
∗) = max
{
b¯∗ − s
2
, s− vs
}
if vs < b¯
∗.
The value of s that minimizes the above maximum loss is
s∗(vs) =
b¯∗
3
+
2vs
3
, if vs < b¯
∗.
Alternatively, if there is no gain from trade, so vs ≥ b¯∗, then the seller obtains
zero loss by choosing any bid that guarantees no trade, for example, s∗(vs) = vs.
Symmetrically, we obtain that the buyer’s best compromise strategy satisfies
b∗(vb) =
{
¯
s∗
3
+ 2vb
3
, if vb >
¯
s∗,
vb, if vb ≤
¯
s∗.
Since vs, vb ∈ [0, 1], we have
¯
s∗ = s∗(0) =
b¯∗
3
and b¯∗ = b∗(1) =
2 +
¯
s∗
3
.
Thus,
¯
s∗ = 1/4 and b¯∗ = 3/4. Therefore, the PCE (s∗, b∗) given by (26). 
B.2. Public Good Provision. Here we investigate the provision of a public good
when each beneficiary knows her own value but not that of the others.
There are n agents, each has a private value vi ∈ [0, v¯] for the public good.
Each agent i commits to contribute at most xi ∈ [0, v¯] in case the public good is
provided. Agents make their commitments simultaneously.
The cost of providing the public good is c > 0. If the sum of committed
contributions does not cover the cost, so
∑n
i=1 xi < c, then the public good is not
provided, and each agent i obtains zero payoff. Otherwise, if
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ c, then
the public good is provided, and each agent i obtains the payoff
vi − ti(x),
where ti(x) is the final transfer of agent i that depends on the profile of committed
contributions x = (x1, ..., xn). We assume that the transfer rule ti must satisfy:
(a) ti(x) ≤ xi, so no agent pays more than her committed contribution,
(b)
∑n
i=1 ti(x) ≥ c,
(c) t = (t1, ..., tn) is symmetric, so agents are treated ex ante equally.
In addition, we assume that the cost of public good provision is relatively small,
specifically,
c ≤ 1
2
(n− 1)v¯. (27)
This assumption simplifies the exposition. The complementary case can also be
easily analysed.
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Let si(vi) be a strategy of agent i, so xi = si(vi) specifies the maximal contribu-
tion of agent i. As in Section B.1, we restrict attention to strategies that satisfy
the following assumption.
Strategies si are continuous, strictly increasing, and
si(v) = sj(v) for all i, j = 1, ..., n and all v ∈ [0, v¯].
(A2)
We compare three simple transfer rules.
(i) Pay-as-you-bid rule. Each agent pays as much as she commits to contribute
whenever the good is provided, so
ti(x) = xi. (28)
(ii) Proportional rule. Each agent i pays proportionally to her commitment xi
whenever the good is provided, so
ti(x) =
cxi∑n
j=1 xj
. (29)
(iii) Additive rule. Each agent i pays the equal share c/n plus the difference
between her commitment and the average commitment, so
ti(x) =
c
n
+ xi − 1
n
n∑
j=1
xj . (30)
The assumptions (a), (b), and (c) are easily verified for these transfer rules.
We will measure the efficiency of a PCE profile s∗ by the ratio of the maximum
welfare loss to the maximum possible surplus nv¯. Our measure is denoted by
C¯(s∗) and is given by
C¯(s∗) = sup
(v1,...,vn)∈[0,v¯]n
{
1
nv¯
max{0,∑i vi − c}, if ∑i s∗i (vi) ≥ c,
0, if
∑
i s
∗
i (vi) < c.
It turns out in the PCE presented below that the inefficiency emerges only when
the public good is not provided when it is efficient to do so.
Proposition 7. A strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, ..., s
∗
n) that satisfies (A2) is a PCE if
and only if for all i = 1, ..., n and all vi ∈ [0, v¯],
(i) if ti(x) is the pay-as-you-bid rule, then
s∗i (vi) =
vi
2
and C¯(s∗) =
1
2
;
(ii) if ti(x) is the proportional rule, then
s∗i (vi) =
vi
2
− c+ 1
2
√
v2i + 4c
2 and C¯(s∗) =
n
2n+ 1
;
(iii) if ti(x) is the additive rule, then
s∗i (vi) =
n
2n− 1vi and C¯(s
∗) =
n− 1
2n− 1 .
Note that 1
2
> n
2n+1
> n−1
2n−1
. So, the additive rule is the most efficient among
these three transfer rules.
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Proof. An agent who chooses xi worries about two contingencies. First, it could
be that the total contribution is just below c, so
∑
j xj = c − ε, so the good is
not provided, but had i contributed ε more it would have been provided. So, as
ε→ 0, agent i’s loss is max{vi − xi, 0}.
Second, it could be that all other agents contribute enough to cover c, so∑
j 6=i xj ≥ c, so the agent could have contributed nothing and still got the good.
In this case the loss is the amount of contribution, ti(x). Under all three assump-
tions, this loss is maximized when the other agents’ contributions exactly equal
to the cost, so
∑
j 6=i xj = c. If ti(x) is given by (28), then the loss is xi. If ti(x) is
given by (29), then the loss is cxi/(c+ xi). If ti(x) is given by (30), then the loss
is (n− 1)xi/n.
As the first type of loss is weakly decreasing and the second type of loss is
strictly increasing in xi, we equalize the two and solve for x
∗
i (vi) that minimizes
the maximum loss. For each of the assumptions about ti(x), the solution x
∗
i (vi) is
given by (i), (ii), and (iii) in Claim 7.
The maximum individual surplus is vi, so the maximal individual loss εi(vi) is
simply max{vi−x∗i (vi), 0}/vi = 1−x∗i (vi)/vi. Substituting the obtained solutions
x∗i (vi) into this expression, we obtain εi(vi) in (i), (ii), and (iii) in Claim 7.
It remains to verify that there exist values vj for each j 6= i such that
∑
j 6=i x
∗(vj) ≥
c. If ti(x) is given by (28), then
sup
∑
j 6=i
x∗(vj) = sup
∑
j 6=i
vj
2
=
(n− 1)v¯
2
,
If ti(x) is given by (29), then
sup
∑
j 6=i
x∗(vj) = sup
∑
j 6=i
(
vj
2
− c+ 1
2
√
v2j + 4c
2
)
= (n− 1)
(
v¯
2
− c+ 1
2
√
v¯2 + 4c2
)
≥ (n− 1)v¯
2
.
Finally, if ti(x) is given by (30), then
sup
∑
j 6=i
x∗(vj) = sup
∑
j 6=i
nvj
2n− 1 = (n− 1)
nv¯
2n− 1 ≥
(n− 1)v¯
2
.
Since c ≤ (n−1)v¯
2
by assumption (27), we obtain that there exist values vj for each
j 6= i such that ∑j 6=i x∗(vj) ≥ c. 
B.3. Forecasting. Here we consider the problem of forecasting of a variable
whose underlying distribution is unknown. With this example we illustrate how
noise influences learning. To keep the focus on learning, we present a one-shot
decision problem of a single player.
Consider a forecaster who has to predict θ ∈ [0, 1]. The variable θ is drawn from
a distribution F on [0, 1]. The forecaster’s payoff is the quadratic loss:
u(a, θ) = −(a− θ)2.
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Before making a prediction, the forecaster observes a noisy signal z about θ.
We analyze two variations of this model. In one variation, the forecaster knows
how the noisy signal z is generated but she is uncertain about the distribution
of the fundamental variable θ. In the other variation, the forecaster knows the
distribution of θ but she is uncertain about the signal generating process.
B.3.1. Unknown Distribution of Variable θ. Here we are interested in how to make
a prediction without knowing how the variable of interest is distributed.
Suppose that the forecaster does not know the distribution F . She only knows
the expected value of of this distribution, denoted by θ0. We allow for any such
distribution F that admits a density f such that δ ≤ f(θ) ≤ 1/δ for some δ ∈
(0, 1). The last assumption excludes zero and unbounded densities. The set Fδ of
such distributions is thus given by
Fδ = {F ∈ ∆([0, 1]) : EF [θ] = θ0 and δ ≤ f(θ) ≤ 1/δ for all θ ∈ [0, 1]} .
The forecaster can condition her prediction on a noisy signal z about θ. The
signal generating process is known and given by a conditional probability distri-
bution G(z|θ). For a given ε > 0, signal z reveals the true value θ with probability
1− ε and a uniform draw from [0, 1] with probability ε, so
Gε(z|θ) =
{
εz, if z < θ,
1− ε+ εz, if z ≥ θ.
Had the forecaster known the distribution F ∈ Fδ, she could have formed a
posterior about θ conditional on the signal z. Let EF,Gε[·|z] denote the expectation
under this posterior.
The maximum loss of a prediction a ∈ [0, 1] given z ∈ [0, 1] is
l(a; z) = sup
F∈Fδ
(
sup
a′∈[0,1]
EF,Gε [−(a′ − θ)2|z]− EF,Gε[−(a− θ)2|z]
)
.
A best compromise is a prediction a∗(z) that achieves the least maximum loss, so
a∗(z) ∈ argmin
a∈[0,1]
l(a; z).
This problem can be embedded in our formal setting as described in Section 2.
As the distribution F is unknown, it is identified as the state. So the set of states
is Fδ. In the formal game, first nature chooses a state F . Then the nonstrategic
player 0 observes F and generates a signal z. Finally, the forecaster observes z
and makes a prediction.
Proposition 8. Let ε ∈ [0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1). The forecaster’s best compromise is
a∗(z) = (1− λ)z + λθ0,
where
λ =
ε
2
(
δ
1− ε(1− δ) +
1
δ + ε(1− δ)
)
.
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We postpone the proof to the end of this subsection. To describe the intuition,
let us start with a simple observation.
Lemma 2. l(a; z) = supF∈Fδ(a− EF,Gε[θ|z])2.
The intuition is as follows. The variance of θ conditional on a signal z enters
the payoffs additively, and thus cancels out when computing the loss. As a result,
the maximum loss l(a; z) is simply the maximum quadratic distance between a
and the expected value of θ conditional on z.
Proof of Lemma 2. Fix Gε. Let a¯F (z) = EF,Gε[θ|z]. Observe that
a¯F (z) ∈ argmax
a′∈[0,1]
EF,Gε[−(a′ − θ)2|z]. (31)
So, we have
sup
a′∈[0,1]
EF,Gε[−(a′−θ)2|z]−EF,Gε [−(a−θ)2|z] = EF,Gε[−(a¯F (z)−θ)2+(a−θ)2|z]
= EF,Gε[(a− a¯F (z))(a + a¯F (z)− 2θ)|z] = (a− a¯F (z))2,
where the first equality is by (31) and the last equality is by EF,Gε[θ|z] = a¯F (z).
Thus,
l(a; z) = sup
F∈Fδ
(a− a¯F (z))2 = sup
F∈Fδ
(a− EF,Gε[θ|z])2. 
So, different distributions F ∈ Fδ induce different posterior means EF,Gε[θ|z].
When making a prediction a, the forecaster worries about a possible loss of
(a− EF,Gε[θ|z])2. The best compromise is thus the midpoint between the highest
posterior mean H(z) and the lowest posterior mean L(z) conditional on z, where
H(z) = sup
F∈Fδ
EF,Gε[θ|z] and L(z) = inf
F∈Fδ
EF,Gε[θ|z]. (32)
Note that the posterior mean EF,Gε[θ|z] is always between the prior mean θ0
and the observed signal z. So, the best compromise a∗(z) can be expressed as
a weighted average of z and θ0.
Note that the best compromise a∗ is continuous in ε and satisfies
a∗(z)→ z as ε→ 0 and a∗(z)→ θ0 as ε→ 1.
As the noise vanishes, the signal becomes the best predictor. As the noise becomes
dominant, so the signal becomes uninformative, the ex ante mean θ0 becomes the
best predictor.
Now fix ε > 0 and observe that
a∗(z)→ z + θ0
2
as δ → 0.
When the only assumption imposed on the set of distributions F is that EF [θ] = θ0,
the best predictor is the midpoint between z and θ0. In particular, even though
the noise ε may be very small, it is fixed and plays no role in this limit. Intuitively,
depending on distribution F , the signal z might be the best predictor. Or it might
be useless when the value z of this signal under F is very unlikely, in which case
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the signal contains hardly any information, and θ0 is the best predictor. The best
compromise balances the losses in these two extreme cases.
Note the discontinuity of a∗(z) at ε = 0 and δ = 0. This is because the limit of
a∗ depends on the order of the limits of ε and δ.
Proof of Proposition 8. Let H(z) and L(z) be the highest and lowest posterior
means of θ conditional on z given by (32). We have
l(a; z) = sup
F∈Fδ
(a− EF,Gε[θ|z])2 = max
{
(a−H(z))2, (a− L(z))2}
where the first equality is by Lemma 2, and the last equality is by the convexity
of the expression. Thus,
a∗(z) = inf
a∈[0,1]
l(a; z) =
1
2
(H(z) + L(z)) .
It remains to find H(z) and L(z). Suppose that z ≥ θ0. Observe that
EF,Gε[θ|z] =
(1− ε)f(z)z + ε ∫ 1
0
θf(θ)dθ
(1− ε)f(z) + ε ∫ 1
0
f(θ)dθ
=
(1− ε)f(z)z + εθ0
(1− ε)f(z) + ε
is increasing in f(z). Using the assumption that f(z) ≤ 1/δ, we have
H(z) = sup
F∈Fδ
(1− ε)f(z)z + εθ0
(1− ε)f(z) + ε =
(1− ε)f(z)z + εθ0
(1− ε)f(z) + ε
∣∣∣∣
f(z)=1/δ
=
(1− ε)z + εδθ0
1− ε+ εδ .
Using the assumption that f(z) ≥ δ, we have
L(z) = inf
F∈Fδ
(1− ε)f(z)z + εθ0
(1− ε)f(z) + ε =
(1− ε)f(z)z + εθ0
(1− ε)f(z) + ε
∣∣∣∣
f(z)=δ
=
(1− ε)δz + εθ0
(1− ε)δ + ε .
Analogously, for z ≤ θ0 we obtain H(z) = (1−ε)δz+εθ0(1−ε)δ+ε and L(z) = (1−ε)z+εδθ01−ε+εδ . Thus
we obtain
a∗(z) =
1
2
(H(z) + L(z)) =
1
2
(
(1− ε)z + εδθ0
1− ε+ εδ +
(1− ε)δz + εθ0
(1− ε)δ + ε
)
. 
B.3.2. Unknown Distribution of Signal z. Here we are interested in how uncertain
noise influences prediction.
Suppose that the forecaster knows the distribution F of θ, but is uncertain
about how the signal z is generated. The signal generating process is given as
follows. Let δ > 0. Let the signal z be given by the sum of the variable θ and a
noise y, so
z = θ + y,
where y is drawn independently from the interval [−δ, δ]. Note that z = θ + y ∈
[−δ, 1 + δ], so z can be outside of [0, 1].
Let ε ∈ [0, 1]. With probability 1 − ε, the noise y is drawn from a given
distribution G0 on [−δ, δ]. With the complementary probability ε, the noise y is
drawn from a distribution G over [−δ, δ]. We assume that the forecaster knows
this process except that she does not know G. We allow for all distributions G
whose support is within [−δ, δ]. So the forecaster is fairly certain that the noise y is
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drawn from G0, but puts probability ε that it is drawn from another distribution.
Thus, a state is identified with the distribution G, and the set of states Gδ is the
set of all distributions on [−δ, δ].
Let EF,G,ε[·|z] denote the expectation of θ conditional on z for a given G ∈ Gδ
this posterior. The maximum loss associated with a prediction a ∈ [0, 1] given a
signal z ∈ [0, 1] is calculated as in Section B.3, except that now the set of states
is Gδ, so
l(a; z) = sup
G∈Gδ
(
sup
a′∈[0,1]
EF,G,ε[−(a′ − θ)2|z]− EF,G,ε[−(a− θ)2|z]
)
.
In the next result, the distribution F of θ is defined on R and its density is zero
outside of [0, 1].
Proposition 9. Let ε ∈ [0, 1] and δ > 0. The forecaster’s best compromise is
a∗(z) =
1
2
(H(z) + L(z)) ,
where
H(z) = sup
G∈Gδ
EF,G,ε[θ|z] = sup
x∈[−δ,δ]
εf(z − x)(z − x) + (1− ε) ∫ δ
−δ
(z − y)f(z − y)dG0(y)
εf(z − x) + (1− ε) ∫ δ
−δ
f(z − y)dG0(y)
,
L(z) = inf
G∈Gδ
EF,G,ε[θ|z] = inf
x∈[−δ,δ]
εf(z − x)(z − x) + (1− ε) ∫ δ
−δ
(z − y)f(z − y)dG0(y)
εf(z − x) + (1− ε) ∫ δ
−δ
f(z − y)dG0(y)
.
The proof is analogous to that of Proposition 8 and thus omitted.
Just like in Section B.3, in this model the best compromise is the midpoint
between the highest posterior mean H(z) and the lowest posterior mean L(z)
conditional on z. The difference from Section B.3 is how these extreme posterior
means are calculated. Observe that they are always in the δ-neighborhood of z.
As the neighborhood size δ approaches to 0, the extreme posterior means approach
z, so
H(z)→ z and L(z)→ z as δ → 0.
Consequently, a∗(z)→ z as δ → 0.
Let is now fix δ > 0 and vary the noise level ε. As the noise vanishes, ε → 0,
both extreme posterior means converge to the posterior mean under the benchmark
distribution G0, so
H(z)→ EF,G0,0[θ|z] and L(z)→ EF,G0,0[θ|z] as ε→ 0.
Consequently, a∗(z)→ EF,G0,0[θ|z] as ε→ 0. For instance, if G0 is the uniform dis-
tribution, then the best predictor converges to the expected value of θ conditional
on being within δ of the signal.
Finally, as ε → 1, so the role of the benchmark G0 disappears and any noise
within [−δ, δ] becomes possible. We obtain
H(z)→ z + δ and L(z)→ z − δ as ε→ 1.
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Consequently, a∗(z) → z as ε → 1. So, as the prior G0 loses its value, the signal
z becomes the best predictor.
